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OFFSHORE MUTUAL FUNDS: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934
An offshore mutual fund is a mutual fund which (1) is incorporated
in a foreign country, (2) does not sell to Americans, and (3) does not
aim its sales campaigns primarily at residents of the country in which
it is incorporated.' Because of their freedom from regulation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 and because of favor-
able tax laws,' these funds have become an extremely popular vehicle
for foreign investment in United States securities' Although the
growth of offshore mutual funds has had a favorable impact on the
United States balance of payments,' the proliferation of these funds
creates great potential for harm to the American securities markets.
According to the SEC, (1) foreign funds may be used to acquire
specific United States companies, in contravention of existing laws and
national interest; 0 (2) heavy offshore fund sales of a single United States
stock or heavy redemption of United States mutual fund shares could
upset market stability and injure the individual security involved;
1 An offshore fund is defined as a mutual fund, hedge fund, leverage fund,
investment company or combination thereof that (a) is incorporated in a foreign
country (generally, but not necessarily, a country offering tax advantages . . .),
(b) does all or most or a principal part of its selling to persons who are not
U.S. citizens or residents, and (c) whose principal sales efforts are not aimed
primarily at residents of the country in which the fund is legally incorporated.
SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3,
ch. 7, at 879 n.1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study],
2 Id. at 881-82, 949. Under Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2 (1971), foreign
issuers with fewer than 300 holders resident in the United States are exempt from
registration under 12 of the Exchange Act. For this reason the provisions of the Act
relating to a fund trading in its own stock are, under the Rule, inapplicable to offshore
funds.
8 Id. at 904-12, 949. See also Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Off-
shore Mutual Funds, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 404, 404-22 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, U.S..
Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds].
• See SEC Institutional investor Study, supra note 1, at 879, 920-41, 949.
5
 Id, at 920, 949; Note, U.S. Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds,
supra note 3, at 404-06.
O SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, at 945, 951. "For example, one
offshore fund was alleged in October, 1970 to hold approximately 28 percent of the
stock of a U.S. company subject to the Shipping Act of 1916, which limits foreign owner-
ship in such companies to a maximum of 25 percent." Id. at 951. The potentially harmful
impact presented by offshore mutual funds is enhanced by the avoidance of SEC margin
and leverage standards. Id. at 945.
7 Id. at 945-47, 951. The Study indicates that it is improbable that such sales could
have a significant direct effect on general market stability, but that the effect on a given
security could be significant. Id. at 947, 951. The improbability , of a significant direct im-
pact on general market' stability is debatable. See, e.g., Note, Offshore Mutual Funds:
Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, 3 Law & Pol, Int'l Bus. 157, 165 n.38 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory
Dilemma]; see also SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, at 946: "There has
been at least one occasion in the past when heavy concentrated foreign sales of U.S.
securities had a noticeably depressing effect on the NYSE."
n
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(3) the confidence of foreign investors in all offshore funds may be
shaken by the demise of some, thus impairing the flow of foreign funds
into the United States; 8
 (4) since many offshore funds are viewed by
foreigners as American companies, problems with those funds may
create an apprehension about investing in registered United States
funds;° and (5) foreign regulation of the activities of offshore funds
may be applied to all investment companies which are not native to the
regulating country, including registered United States funds.'°
It seems clear that some regulation- is desirable in order to mini-
mize the harm threatened by offshore funds. Possible methods of con-
trol include regulation by the industry itself, by individual foreign
nations, by the United States and by international agreement. While
any of these methods could insulate the American securities markets
from substantial harm, all except United States regulation have in-
herent problems. For example, self-regulation by the offshore fund
industry would probably lack effective enforcement mechanisms; 11
foreign regulation could be indiscriminately applied to registered
United States funds; 12
 and meaningful international regulation may be
precluded by diplomatic and international policy considerations. 18
More importantly, none of these methods is presently - available as a
means of regulating offshore funds. United States regulation, however,
provides the distinct advantage of an already existing, well-developed
body of federal securities law to draw upon.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 14 is espe-
cially well-suited for the regulation of offshore funds. As will be shown
in this comment, Section 30(b) of this Act" permits selective regula-
tion of securities transactions that are predominately foreign, thus
making it possible to regulate only those activities harmful to American
markets, while insuring the benefits of regulatory, freedom for more
innocuous activities. Furthermore, Section 10(b) of this Act provides a
remedy for fraud in both the new issue and the trading markets, thus
governing all activities of the offshore funds."
8
 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, at 947. In fact, as investors with-
draw funds, the outflow of foreign capital injures the balance of payments. Id. at 952.
9
 Id. at 947, 949, 952.
19
 Id. at 950.
11
 One commentator has advocated self-regulation. Siekman, The Offshore Funds
Are in Dangerous Waters, Fortune, Aug. 1970, 118, at 160.
For a description of the compensation and sales techniques of offshore funds, see
SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, at 894-901; see generally C. Raw, B.
Page, B. G. Hodgson, "Do You Sincerely Want To Be Rich?" (1971).
12
 See text at note I0 supra. See generally SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra
note 1, at 913-20, 950. See Note, West German Regulation of Foreign Mutual Fund
Distributions, 3 N.Y.U. J. Intl Law & Pol. 323 (1970), for a discussion of the West
German regulatory statute. See also Note, Offshore Mutual Funds; Possible Solutions to
a Regulatory Dilemma, supra note 7, at 200-03.
18
 See, e.g., Siekman, supra note 11, at 160.
14 15 U.S.C. $§ 78a et seq. (1970).
15
 U.S.C. $ 78dd(b) (1970).
18
 For an analysis of the effect of all United States securities laws on the offshore
1226
. OFFSHORE MUTUAL FUNDS. AND THE 1934 ACT
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
The initial inquiry in determining the ' applicability of the Ex-
change Act to any transaction, domestic or foreign, is whether the
jurisdictional requirements specified in the Act .have been met. The
three primary jurisdictional bases are (1), use of the mails or other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; ' 7 (2) the .presence of a
security registered with the SEC;" or (3) the presence of a broker;
dealer or member of a national securities exchange.n If the applicable
basis (or bases) for jurisdiction is present, a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the transaction in question." However, notwith-
standing satisfaction of the statutory jurisdictional requirements, some
transactions are exempted from the requirements of the Exchange Act
by the provisions.of Section 30(b). The exemption applies to,
any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities
without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he trans-
acts such business in contravention of, such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may, prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter 2 1
The scope of section 30(b), however, is unclear. Since the SEC
has not exercised its rule-making power, the task of defining the exemp-
tion presently rests with the federal judiciary. The decisions in this
area have focused upon the problems of construing the phrases "person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities," and "without the
jurisdiction of the United States." If the Exchange Act is to be used as
a tool for selective regulation of offshore mutual fund activities, the
fund must be viewed as a "person" transacting a business in securities.
If it is not so viewed, the section 30(b) exemption never applies and
statutorily mandated selective" regulation is impossible." If, however,
an offshore fund is viewed as a person transacting a business in. secu-.
rities, fund transactions may or may not be regulated, depending on
mutual fund industry, see Nate, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible SolutiOns to a
Regulatory Dilemma, supra note 7, at 171-92; see also Note, U.S. Taxation and Regula-
tion of Offshore Mutual Funds, supra note 3, at 432-52.
17 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). "Incidental" or "indirect"
use of the mails or other instrumentalities of ,interstate commerce is sufficient to confer
statutory jurisdiction. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1519-28 '(2d ed. 1961)..It is
enough to show that another was caused to use 'the instrumentality, or that it might
reasonably have been foreseen that such use would occur. Id. at 1524.
18
 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C.
	 78i(a) (1970).
19 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
20 Problems of enforcement are beyond the scope of this article. See generally 3
L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1852-61 (2d ed. 1961). Section 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1970), delineates jurisdiction under the Exchange Act and provides for worldwide
service of process in dvil actions. See Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations -795-96
(4th ed. unabridged 1969). On the problem of venue, see 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
2007-15 (2d ed. 1961).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970).
22 For discussion of the issue whether isolated transactions come within the exemp-
tion, see note 30 infra.
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whether the transaction complained of occurred without the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. This, in turn, depends on whether the term
"jurisdiction" is defined as protective or territorial jurisdiction." If the
latter term is adopted, only domestic transactions will be regulated. If,
however, the former is adopted, nondomestic transactions threatening
substantial harm to domestic markets and investors can be regulated.
Since the activities of offshore funds do not typically occur within the
territory of the United States, but frequently do have the potential for
inflicting significant injury upon domestic exchanges and investors, it
would seem that effective American regulation presupposes that only
those activities without the protective jurisdiction should be exempt
from the provisions of the Act.
A. "Person Insofar as He Transacts a Business in Securities"
On its face, the statutory. language seems clearly to encompass
offshore mutual funds. They are "persons" within the statutory defini-
tion of section 3 (a) ( 9) 24
 and they obviously transact business in secu-
rities, at least in the generic sense. Nevertheless, the section 3 (a) (9)
definition does not apply if the context of usage otherwise requires;
moreover, no court has been presented squarely with the question of
whether mutual funds are persons transacting a business in securities.
The leading decision interpreting the phrase "person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities" is Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 23
 The
Second Circuit in that case stated that the purpose of section 30(b) is
to allow persons in the securities business to conduct securities transac-
tions outside the United States without having to comply with the
burdensome' reporting and regulatory provisions of the Act. The court
reasoned that Congress had not intended to exempt every transaction
outside the United States by any person; such a result could have been
achieved easily by using the phrase "any transaction in any security.""
Certainly brokers and dealers transact business in securities and come
within the scope of the section. However, the court determined that
the statutory language was more inclusive since the defined terms
"broker" and "dealer" could have been used if the exemption were
Confined to them." The court stated• that the reason the drafters used
the phrase ,"person insofar as he transacts abusiness in securities" in
section' 30(b) was that "it is a term which would exempt the business
transactions not.only of brokers and dealers but also of banks.""
It should be.noted that the court's language does not specifically
23 See pp. 1231-49 infra.
24 15 U.S.C. 78c(a) (9) (1970).
26
 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968)
(en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). The facts of this case are set forth at p. 1238
infra.
20 405 F.2d at 207-08. The court noted that 130(a) employs this more expansive
wording. Id. at 208.
-	 27
 Id. See '15 •U.S.C. 	 78c(a) (4), (5) (1970), for the definitions of these terms.
28 405 F.2d at 208.
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restrict the term "person" to brokers, dealers and banks; the court's
language can also be interpreted to mean that the phrase includes, at
minimum, these persons. By implication, others may. also be persons
transacting business in securities within the meaning of section 30(b).
This implicit nonexclusive interpretation is supported by the court's
recognition that the term "bank" is also defined in the Exchange Act."
It would thus appear that "person" must include more than brokers,
dealers and banks since these terms could have been used if the legis-
lative intent had been to limit the exemption solely to them. This inter-
pretation is substantiated by the court's opinion that the purpose of
Section 30(b) is to exempt from the provisions of the Exchange Act
only those persons who, because they conduct a business in securities
outside the United States, would otherwise be subject to onerous
reporting requirements."
29
 Id. See 15 U.S.C, § 78c(a) (6) '(1970) for the definition of "bank."
'so For example, offshore mutual funds if not exempt under Rule 12g3-2, could be
viewed as being subject to onerous requirements, and statutorily exempt. whether or not
they are viewed as dealers. See note 2 supra.
Another problem arises concerning whether a person engaged in isolated foreign
transactions should be viewed as transacting a business in securities. In the memorandum
opinion in Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer. Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 91,615. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1965), the court answered this question affirmatively, stating
that the intent to exempt those in the securities , business must also include the intent to
exempt single, isolated transactions:
Surely, if Congress intended to exempt from the Act those persons who are
extraterritorially engaged in the securities business, it intended to exempt those
who extraterritorially enter into a single, isolated sale of securities.
Id. at 95,311 [footnote omitted].
However, if one accepts the position that the purpose of § 30(b) is to permit
persons in the securities business to conduct' transactions in securities outside the U.S.
without being subject to the burdensome reporting and regulatory provisions of the
Exchange Act (see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968)), the
less onerous burdens placed upon private investors may indicate that private investors
should not be viewed as transacting business in securities within the meaning of § 30(b), as
the necessity of exemption from burdensome provisions is less urgent. Cf. Note, Extra-
territorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 94,
106-07 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities
. Exchange Act of 1934]. The possibility that exempted foreign Investment businesses are
subject to foreign regulation involves questions of foreign relations and supports such
an interpretation, The policy considerations which would necessitate exemption of those
engaged in the securities business but not those engaging in isolated transactions have
been well stated:
Congress could quite easily conclude that another country would resent United
States interference concerning the way the investment business is conducted
within its borders more than it would resent the application of the American
rule to occasional transactions by its nationals in United Statei securities. This is
particularly apparent if one considers the likelihood that a foreign based
investment business will be subject to foreign statutory regulation. No country
likes its regulatory scheme to be superseded by those of another country and,
of course, the existence of foreign regulation lessens the need for interference.
. Id. at 106 [footnote omitted]. But see Note, U.S. Taxation and Regulation of Offshore
Mutual Funds, supra note 3, at 448, in which this interpretation . is viewed as being
anomalous: "the threat that regulation will offend a foreign nation may be greatest
precisely when the United States' interest in regulation is most acute::
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If the exemption is viewed as applying when required by special
circumstances,—i.e., in order to avoid onerous reporting require-
thents—it is arguable that other circumstances exist which militate
against regulation. For example, international policy considerations
may 'obviate the practicability of United , States regulation of offshore
mutual funds in some instances, and require that these funds be
exempted from the proVisions of the Act. The "special circumstances"
concept could be incorporated into the court's "burd6nsome" standard
, by balancing the regulatory burdens imposed against the resulting
benefits. Under such a test, international poliCy factors might well
Outweigh the benefits of American regulation in a given circumstance,
thus making compliance with the Exchange Act's provisions counter-
productive and "burdensome."
Nonetheless, Schoenbaum has been interpreted by commentatorsn
and subsequent courts" as limiting the section 30(b) exemption to
brokers; dealers and banks. However, even if this limitation is accepted,
the exemption may still apply to offshore mutual funds, since they
arguably fall within the statutory definition of dealers.as As defined by
section 3(a) (5), a dealer is
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,
but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as be buys
or sells securities for his own account, either individually or
in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular busi-
ness.94
Although the SEC has never required investment companies, domestic
or offshore, to register as brokers or dealers, an offshore mutual fund
can 'be characterized "as being in the business of buying and selling
securities (those they issue and those issued by' portfolio companies)
Since the Schoenbaum court viewed the § 30(b) exemption as being limited to
those in the securities bUsiness, it expressly rejected the dictum of Ferraioli which would
have exempted single, isolated transactions. Nevertheless, the - need for regulation of
foreign investment businesses is great; exemption, absent meaningful foreign regulation,
provides a potentially harmful situation, while exemption of mere private investors does
not include the same potential for harm, Ii the exemption is not viewed as being restricted
to brokers, dealers and . banks, there seems•to be no policy reason not to exempt single,
isolated transactions.
51
 See,- e.g., Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory
Dilemma, supra note 7, at 189; Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, supra note 30, at 105; Note, U.S. Taxation and Regulation of
Offshore Mutual Funds, supra note 3, at 446. •••
• 52 See, e.g., TraVis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,303'at 91;679 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 1971).'
aa SEC Institutional Investor Study; supra note 1, at 901-02. See also Goldman &
Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of
'Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, '55 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1038 (1969).
But see Note, U.S. Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, supra note 3, at
449 n.137.
54 15 U.S.C. 4 78c(a)(5) (1970).
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for its own account."" While there may be good reason not to define a
fund as a dealer in ordinary circumstances," the desirability of selec-
tively regulating offshore funds would justify treating these funds as
dealers for purposes of the section 30(b) exemption.
Thus it is evident that offshore funds are, by no means, auto-
matically excluded from the section 30(b) exemption. Ultimately, the
underlying issue is whether regulation of offshore funds is necessary in
order to achieve the fundamental purposes of the Exchange Act, Such
a contextual analysis should focus more appropriately on the issue of
whether offshore fund activities are within the "protective" jurisdiction
of the Exchange Act." The issue whether an offshore fund is a person
transacting a business in securities should .be determined by consider-
ing the propriety of regulating these activities in light of international
policy considerations. However, the phrase "person insofar as he trans-
acts a business in securities" does not implicate these considerations.
More importantly, a decision that mutual funds are not within the
phrase would preclude statutorily mandated selective regulation.
B. "Without the Jurisdiction of the United States"
Judicial interpretation of section 30(b) has focused primarily on
the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United States."" Initially,
decisions interpreting this phrase addressed the question whether a
particular transaction occurred within the territory of the United
States." However, an emerging, difficult issue is whether the term
"jurisdiction" refers only to territorial jurisdiction or whether it also
encompasses "protective" concepts of jurisdiction." An interpretation
of section 30(b) which limits the exemption to those persons who
transact business "without the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" emphasizes the locus of the offense rather than the threat to
national interests; it, therefore, leaves unregulated transactions which,
while not domestic, could harm substantially American securities
markets. On the other hand, exemption only of those - persons who
transact business "without the protective jurisdiction" would permit
85 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, at 902. Section 3(a) (19) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(19) (1970), adopts the definition of "investment
company" in the Investment Company Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. 9 80a-3(a) (1970).
Mutual funds fall within this definition. See also Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible
Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, supra note 7, at 190.
Dicta in Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., indicates that a mutual fund's trading does not
constitute the transaction of 'business in securities. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d
421, 422 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). One commentator, although
acknowledging that the basis for jurisdiction in Roth was territoriality, nevertheless
concludes that "Roth . . . h[e]ld that a mutual fund investing in securities would not
qualify for exemption from the [Exchange] Act under section 30(b), since it was neither
a 'broker, dealer, nor bank..'" Note, 10 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 150, 161 (1971).
86 Thus the SEC has not required registration.
37 See pp. 1249-53 infra.
88 See discussion pp. 1232-49 infra.
88 See discussion pp. 1232-37 infra.
4° See discussion pp. 1238-49 infra.
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the courts to assert protective jurisdiction over predominantly foreign
transactions if regulation were required to protect significant national
interests. This section of the comment analyses the judicial interpreta-
tions of the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United States" and
concludes that the current trend of judicial thinking is that Section
30(b) exempts from the provisions of the Exchange Act those persons
who transact business in securities without the protective jurisdiction
of the United States.
1. Territorial Interpretation
It is a canon of statutory construction that legislation is presumed
to apply only territorially, unless a contrary intent is clearly mani-
fest.41
 Prior to the decision of Kook v. Crang,42 it was believed that
Section 30(b) strengthened the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the Exchange Act. However,' while Kook endorsed -this
interpretation, it also, inadvertently, anticipated its demise.
The plaintiff in Kook, an American investor, had placed purchase
orders with the defendant, a Canadian brokerage firm maintaining a
New York office and registered as a broker-dealer under the Exchange
Act. The purchases were "on the margin" orders for shares in certain
Canadian corporations made in accordance . with the margin require-
ments of the Toronto Exchange. All orders were placed and executed,
payments received and credit extended in Canada. The stock was is-
• sued in the name of one of the defendant's employees in trust for
plaintiff," and was held in Canada as collateral for the credit. Further-
More, all confirmation . and margin calls emanated from Canada. How-
ever, the transactions did have American contacts; the defendant had
made use of United State's telephone and mail facilities. When the
value of the purchased stock declined sharply, the. plaintiff alleged
violation of the margin requirements of Section 7(c) of the'Exchange
Act."
Although the defendant's status as a registered broker-dealer
Satisfied the statutory requirement for jurisdiction'under Section 7.(c),
the district court ruled that the transactions were specifically exempted
from the coverage of the Exchange Act:
It is a canon of construction that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Con-
gress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. This
construction is reinforced by the Act itself which, in Section
41 See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) ;
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1953).
42 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (per Ryan, C. J.).
43 Id, at 389. "This trust arrangement was part of a plan of the plaintiff to form a
Canadian corporation in hope of effecting a possible tax saving for plaintiff on expected
and anticipated profits." Id.
4 4
 15 U.S.C. 4 78g (c) (1970).
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30(b), specifically restricts the Act to the transaction of busi-
ness within the United States."
The plaintiff contended that the transaction of business had occurred
"within" the United States since American mail and telephone facilities
had been used. However, the court determined that use of the mails
and telephone was insufficient to offset the Canadian character of the
transactions:
The question . . . is not whether there are contacts with the
United States sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction, no One
questions that, but rather whether Congress intended to make
the statute applicable to these transactions."
The court, determined that it was not the intent of Congress to make
the Exchange Act applicable to this Canadian transaction and held
"that 'jurisdiction' as used in Section 30(b) contemplates some neces-
sary and substantial act within the United States."' The Kook court
explicitly stated that section 30(b) reinforced the presumption that
legislation is territorial; the court ignored technical statutory jurisdic-
tion and implemented a test which emphasized the locus of the ac-
tivities. Section 30(b) was thus interpreted to mean that transactions
which were without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
were, exempt from the provisions of the Exchange Act.
The court's opinion that Congress intended the Act to apply only
territorially seems inconsistent with the court's position that the SEC
could extend the scope of coverage to include extraterritorial transac-
tions, even where there has been no "necessary and substantial act
within the United States." 4B This recognition of the SEC's rule; making
power implies acceptance of the argument that the primary intent of
Congress in enacting the Exchange Act was to protect the American
45 182 F. Supp. at 390 (citations omitted).
45 Id.
47 Id. at 390-91. The court characterized plaintiff's contacts with defendant's New
York office, involving weekly communication, as constituting advice given by "an
informal adviser ... who had become personally acquainted with plaintiff." Id. at 389.
It would have taken little imagination to find this "informal" advice to be both sub-
stantial and necessary to plaintiff's dealings with the defendant.
In requiring a "necessary" act, the court clearly did not mean that it was necessary
only to show some act done within the United States; nor did the court mean only that
the required act be one that necessarily had to be done within the United States. The
court indicated that some act necessary to the transaction in question must be shown:
In this suit, plaintiff must show some act done within the United States either in
furtherance of the direct or indirect extension of credit or In the furtherance
of the direct or indirect maintenance of credit. We find none. All contacts with
and acts done by the New York Office of defendant had no remote connection
with the credit arrangement.
Id. at 391. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
if 93,303, at 91,680-81 (l .D. Mo. June 24, 1971).
48 182 F. Supp, at 391.
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securities markets" and that implementation of this primary purpose
might require regulation even absent a necessary and substantial act
within the United States. In such circumstances, the SEC could con-
tract the scope of the section 30(b) exemption in order to effect the
legislative intent. While the court's inconsistency may be attacked as
an example of "facile judicial reasoning,' it nevertheless fore-
shadowed later judicial interpretations of the legislative intent regard-
ing section 30(b). 51
The next case to consider extraterritorial application of the Ex-
change Act was SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp. 52 In that
case the individual defendants, residing in Florida, controlled five
private Florida companies. They organized a Canadian corporation
and publicly offered stock by means of extensive advertising in leading
daily newspapers published in Canada. The proceeds of the distribu-
tion were deposited in Montreal banks and were used to purchase notes
executed by the Florida corporations and the individual defendants.
In this way the. funds were diverted directly and indirectly through
salaries and other expenses of the Florida corporations to the . indi-
vidual defendants. Various interstate facilities were used throughout
the transaction.
The SEC brought suit for injunctive relief, alleging violations of
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933," Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act" and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder." The ap-
pointment of a receiver and an accounting were also requested in order
that assets obtained by the sales could be recouped. The defendants
contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the
offer, sales and corporate existence of the offering corporation were
all limited to Canadian territory. Citing the Kook decision, the de-
fendants argued that Congress had not intended to authorize suits in
this situation.
The court held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction. The
statutory basis for jurisdiction under section 10 (b)—i.e., the use of
the facilities of interstate commerce—was clearly present. Further-
more, the court noted that the case involved a single scheme to defraud
investors spanning both nations, essential parts of which had occurred
within the United States." The offer of foreign securities in foreign
40
 Goldman & Magrino, supra note 33, at 1028. The purposes of the Act are de-
lineated in § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
" Goldman & Magrino, supra note 33, at 1028.
51 See pp. 1238-41 infra.
52
 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (per Choate, J.).
53
 13 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) (fraudulent interstate transactions).
54 15 U.S.C.
	 78j(b) (1970) (manipulative and deceptive devices).
56 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
86 223 F. Supp. at 994-95. The court suggested that it might find a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction if it were possible to separate Canadian actions from the rest of the
plan. Id. at 994. However, this separation was deemed impossible:
The Canadian sales could not have been brought about without the representa-
tions to the investors of the underlying securities in the Florida corporations,
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newspapers which were sold to Americans within the United States was
sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction; proof that sales actually re-
sulted or that the alleged misrepresentations had induced sales was not
required.57
Since the case involved both a fraudulent scheme and offer within
the United States, the court found no reason to consider the extent of
the Section 30(b) exemption from the Exchange Act. Nonetheless, the
court gratuitously discussed the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws, observing that these laws do not appear to be limited
solely to residents of the United States:
[Ti here is nothing within the Acts . . . which would appear
to limit the protection offered by Section 17(a) and Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to residents of the United States. It
would appear that where the scheme is one which necessarily
must be accomplished in part by the use of the mails or inter-
state facilities within the limits of our federal jurisdiction
that even though the offer were made entirely outside the
nation that the remedial protection of these sections may be
invoked. Whether the corpus delicti . is use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce or whether it is fraud, it is
obvious that the use of interstate facilities either directly or
indirectly is the jurisdictional base of a complaint or prosecu-
tion under these sections."
Although the use of interstate facilities seems necessary for con-
summation of the transactions in Kook as well as Gulf," in Kook the
nor could the monies received from such sales be siphoned off into the hands of
the individual conspirators without the individual or corporate activity taking
place within this district.
Id. at 995.
The Gulf court did not analyze Kook, stating merely that Kook was "clearly dis-
tinguishable." The court continued: "In fact, dictum in Kook found at page 391 of 182
F. Supp. would support the conclusion reached in the instant case." 223 F. Supp, at 994
n.9. Presumably, the Gull court was referring to the second passage from Kook quoted at
note 47 supra.
(7 223 F. Supp, at 994-95. It must be noted, however, that this offer was not the
sole act occurring within the United States in the scheme to defraud.
One commentator has criticized the reliance on this international offering, claiming
that the absence of acceptances from the United States indicates that "the offer was not
seriously considered by either offerors or offerees to be effective outside [Canada]." Note,
36 U. Colo. L. Rev, 593, 595 n.8 (1964). The same commentator notes that the require-
ment that the American public be exposed to the offer invites the labelling of an offer
as being restricted to non-Americans. Id, at 594-95. This restriction is in fact imposed
by offshore mutual funds in order to avoid regulation under the securities laws. See
SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 3,
ch. 7, at 882, 902 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study].
55 223 F. Supp. at 995 (emphasis added).
55 Since Kook was an American resident living within the United States, it was
inevitable and necessary that the instrumentalities of interstate commerce be used. Fur-
thermore, this residency was known to the Canadian defendant. With little imagination,
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transaction was characterized as Canadian, while in Gulf the fraud was
binational. Kook held that Congress did not intend to regulate foreign
transactions absent necessary and substantial acts within the United
States; the incidental use of the mails was insufficient, in itself, to
negate the section 30(b) exemption. Gulf found that the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce in connection with a transnational
scheme to defraud investors justified the regulation of activities which
also had significant foreign characteristics. Arguably, the fraudulent
acts committed within the United States fulfilled the "necessary and
substantial" requirements proposed by Kook. However, Gulf went
further than Kook by intimating that the satisfaction of the statutory
jurisdictional requirement, in itself, could serve as the jurisdictional
basis for the regulation of an otherwise foreign transaction."
Extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act was next con-
sidered in Ferraioli v. Cantor," a case in which minority shareholders of
a United States corporation challenged sale of the controlling interest
in the corporation at a premium. The plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant, a Canadian corporation, which had owned the controlling
interest, had breached its fiduciary duty toward minority shareholders
by failing to secure for them an equal opportunity to sell. The plaintiff
alleged that this was done by employing manipulative and deceptive
devices in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5. The negotiations and the sale took place in Canada. In a memo-
randum opinion, the court reaffirmed the applicability of the presump-
tion of territoriality." Since the plaintiffs had not alleged that any acts
occurred within the United States, the court granted the defendant's
motion for dismissal, with leave to serve an amended complaint.
The amended complaint alleged that the transfer of power to
control the American corporation had occurred within the United
States. The specific allegation was that one defendant had instructed its
designee officers and directors, serving "within the United States," to
resign in order that the purchaser's designees could hold office. The
instructions had been transmitted through the facilities of. interstate
commerce.
The defendants argued that the negotiatiim and sale, which had
a single, inseparable transaction could have been discovered in Kook. However, the
American-aspects of Kook can still be characterized as insignificant.
60 This dissimilarity can be explained easily if one views the 30(b) exemption as
being applicable only to those regulations whose jurisdictional basis is the identity of the
person involved. Kook relied on identity (§ 7(c)) while Gulf relied on the use of in-
terstate facilities (I 10(b)). This explanation is an interpretation of the phrase "person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities". The Gulf court did not mention this
phrase; furthermore, Kook was not distinguished specifically on this basis. See discussion
pp. 1228-31 supra.
01 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (per Levet, J.).
62 Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,615
(1965). This decision also extended the § 30(b) exemption to "those who extrater-
ritorially enter into a single, isolated sale of securities." Id. at 95,311. See note 30 supra.
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occurred solely in Canada, were separable from the exercise of control.
The court assumed that the Exchange Act applied only to acts com-
mitted within the United States" and found subject matter jurisdic-
tion:
A transfer of control involves more than negotiations
and a sale. Necessarily there must be resignations of direc-
tors .. . . [S]uch resignations were brought about within the
United States through use of the mails and other instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce. That is an United States
act [sic] which is an inseparable part of the alleged viola-
tion .. . . 64
Like the court in Gulf, the Ferraioli court strained to find a single,
inseparable transaction occurring, in part, within the United States.
As a result, the court determined that it was unnecessary to reach the
issue of the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act."
When read together, the Kook, Gulf and Ferraioli decisions reveal
• a judicial inclination to apply the Exchange Act not only to domestic
transactions, but also to transactions predominantly foreign. In Kook,
the court refused to exercise jurisdiction unless a necessary and substan-
tial act had occurred within the United States, despite the presence of
' the statutory jurisdictional requirement. Thus although American con-
tacts existed, the court found them unnecessary to the transaction in-
volved and insufficiently substantial to rebut the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act. However, in Gulf and
especially in Ferraioli, the courts, having found the required jurisdic-
tional base, alai found the transactions to be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, on the basis of American acts "which
were at most little more substantial than [those] in Kook."" Thus
the courts in Gulf and Ferraioli would, in effect, assert jurisdiction if
an act necessary to the overall transaction occurred within the country,
whether or not the act would actually be considered substantial under
the Kook decision. While these courts avoided the issue of the extra-
territorial application of the Act, and, more specifically, the issue
whether the term "jurisdiction" in Section 30(b) refers to protective
or territorial jurisdiction, they effectively applied the Exchange Act to
transactions occurring within the protective jurisdiction of the United
States.
03 Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
64 Id. at 846.
65 259 F. Supp. at 845 n.4. It has been suggested that the issue of extraterritorial
application was not reached because this was not a trial on the merits. See Goldman &
Magrino, supra note 33 at 1031.
66 Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 404, 445 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, U.S. Taxation and Regulation of Off-
shore Mutual Funds]. See.note 59 supra.
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2. Protective Interpretation
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook," the Second Circuit expressly dis-
avowed the presumption that the Exchange Act is applicable only
territorially or that the language of Section 30(b) manifests a con-
gressional intent to prevent extraterritorial application of the statute."
The plaintiff, an American shareholder of a Canadian corporation,
brought a derivative suit, alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants, including directors of the
corporation, had conspired to defraud the corporation; that the de-
fendants had made the corporation sell treasury shares at market price,
which the defendants, possessing undisclosed inside information, knew
did not represent the true value of the shares.
The only United States contact in Schoenbaum was the registra-
tion of Canadian corporate stock with a domestic exchange. The trans-
action had not been consummated on a United States exchange, and
all other aspects of the transaction were outside the United States."
Citing Kook and Ferraioli, the district court found nothing to rebut
the presumption of territoriality and stated that section 30(b) rein-
forced this presumption; therefore, the case was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction." The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that a federal
67
 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (per Lumbard, C. J.), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). On rehearing, the
court explicitly stated that it did not review the earlier decision on the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction and that the earlier decision stands as the holding of the court on
that issue, 405 F.2d at 217.
68
 405 F.2d at 206.
68
 These facts appear in the district court opinion, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268
F. Supp. 385, 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). However, the requisite use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce was found. 405 F.2d at 207 n.2.
70 268 F. Supp. at 392. The court strengthened its territorial interpretation by not-
ing that conventional choice of jaw principles also pointed to the denial of jurisdiction,
reasoning that this denial would enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties. Id. at
392-93. The court further noted the SEC's power to alter the scope of § 30(b)'s ex-
emption:
If the impact of such foreign transactions is of concern, the S.E.C. has power to
make appropriate rules. See section 30(b) of the Exchange Act. The failure
of the S.E.C. to do so in an obvious situation is further indication of the lack
of interest by the United States in such transactions.
Id. at 393. This statement is reminiscent of the Kook court's handling of the SEC's
rule-making power; see text at notes 48-51 supra. Both viewed the rule-making power as
an expression of legislative intent that the SEC can expand the coverage of the Exchange
Act in contravention of the presumption of territoriality as reinforced by 30(b).
Neither court looked to the intent of the securities laws and neither viewed 30(b) in
the context of that intent. However, the district court in Schoenbaum did mention the
"protective principle" of jurisdiction. 268 F. Supp. at 393. The court, however, did not
discuss the possibility of interpreting "jurisdiction" in this "protective" manner since
there was "no allegation of harm occurring within the United States to support the ap-
plication of this, principle." Id.
Throughout this comment Schoenbaum's terminology, i.e., the "protective" principle,
has been adopted. The term "objective territorial" has also been applied. See, e.g., Note,
Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, 3 Law & Pal.
Intl Bus. 157, 187 (1971). See also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
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court has subject matter jurisdiction over transactions occurring out-
side the United States where the transactions violate the Exchange Act,
"at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors."71
Notably, the court did not expressly base its decision on a finding
that registration on a national exchange was a necessary and substan-
tial act. Such a finding would have been required had the court en-
dorsed the Kook rationale that the Exchange Act applies only to acts
occurring within the territory. Rather, the court quite clearly adopted
the protective jurisdiction approach:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic in-
vestors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American secu-
rities."
The court rejected the presumption of territoriality by noting that the
purpose of the Exchange Act, as enunciated in Section 2" is "to regu-
late the stock exchanges and the relationships of the investing public
to corporations which invite public investment by listing on such ex-
changes."'" The court further stated that this protective purpose was
compatible with the provisions of section 30(b) : "[S]ince Congress
found it necessary to draft an exemptive provision for certain foreign
transactions . . . the presumption must be that the Act was meant to
apply to those foreign transactions not specifically exempted."'"
The Schoenbaum decision may be narrowly interpreted by view-
ing it as a territorial application of the Exchange Act and assessing its
implications for the necessary and substantial test. Thus one com-
mentator has interpreted Schoenbaum as completely rejecting the Kook
requirement that a substantial act must occur within the United States
of the United States § 18(b) (1965). The Restatement requires, inter alia, that the harm
be direct and foreseeable in order for an act to come within the objective territorial
jurisdiction of a country. Adoption of this test would present semantic difficulties, since
the usual American harm caused by distribution of offshore fund shares is indirect. See
pp. 1249-53 infra. Furthermore, foreseeability was not mentioned in Schoenbaum. Sec
Becker, Extraterritorial Dimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
Law & Pol. 233, 241 (1969).
71 405 F.2d at 208. Despite this holding, summary judgment for the defendant was
affirmed because of the failure to state a claim under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at
210-14. The Second Circuit (en banc), reversed as to all defendants except one, finding
a triable claim under § 10(b). Id. at 215, 219. See Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firs:brook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1103 ( 1 969).
72 405 F.2d at 206. See note 70 supra. Conware 268 F. Supp. at 393 with 405 F.2d
at 206.
73
 If U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
74 405 F.2d at 206.
75 Id. at 208.
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before a court asserts jurisdiction." ThiS view seems erroneous; the
requirement of a substantial act remains in those circumstances where
jurisdiction is predicated upon the occurrence of a territorial act."
Furthermore, the Schoenbaum holding did not discard the need for a
substantial act in all circumstances, only in situations in which the stock
is registered on a domestic exchange. Thus Schoenbaum arguably held
that registration on an American exchange is a "substantial act" within
the United States sufficient to warrant exercise of jurisdiction in order
to protect American investors when the requisite use of interstate
commerce is present."
Another plausible interpretation of Schoenbaum is that the court
rejected the requirement that the act upon which jurisdiction is based
must be necessary to the transaction giving rise to liability. On the
facts, registration of foreign stock on a domestic exchange was the
basis of jurisdiction; however, registration did not appear necessary to
the alleged wrongdoing. To ;his extent, Schoenbaum seems to differ
from Ferraioli, which deemphasized the "substantiality" requirement
and assumed jurisdiction because use of interstate facilities was neces-
sary to complete the transaction." -
These narrow interpretations of Schoenbaum focus upon its im-
plications for the "necessary and substantial" test. They attempt to
bring the decision within the concept of territoriality and to confine
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act to the facts of the case.
It is submitted that these interpretations should be rejected because the
decision is not based upon a territorial application of the Act;" rather,
76 Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma,
supra note 70 at 183-4. The commentator states that Schoenbaum "discarded the earlier
requirement of a substantial act within the United States. . . ." While this is true when
protective jurisdiction is to be asserted, Schoenbaum did not discard the necessity of
finding a substantial act within the United States in order to assert territorial jurisdic-
tion. Cf. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1 Law
& Pol. Int'I Bus. 168, 170-71 (1969).
77 See pp. 1242-45 infra.
78 This interpretation is supported by the court's discussion of the necessity for
protection:
A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving it of fair com-
pensation for the issuance of its stock would necessarily have the effect of re-
ducing the equity of the corporation's shareholders and this reduction in equity
would be reflected in lower prices for the shares of the domestic stock market.
This impairment of the value of American investments by sales by the issuer in a
foreign country, allegedly in violation of the Ka, has . . a sufficiently serious
effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the
Protection of American investors. . . .
405 F.2d at 208-09 (emphasis added).
The textual statement dearly refers to those sections of the Exchange Act requiring
use of interstate facilities for jurisdiction, such as $ 10(b).
79 Of course, registration can be argued to be "necessary" since it engenders a belief
that the transactions are regulated.
80 But see Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 93,303
(ED. Mo. June 24, 1971):
Schoenbaum also makes it clear that there must be "a necessary and sub-
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Schoenbaum stands primarily for the proposition that jurisdiction
should be asserted when necessary for protective purposes." As noted
previously, the court expressly rejected prior interpretations of Section
30(b) which, focusing upon the "obvious" purpose of the section, con-
cluded that the Exchange Act was applicable only territorially. 82 In-
stead, the court took a broader view; it interpreted the section in light
of the legislative purpose of Congress in enacting the Act, rather than
attempting to discern the intent in including the section. within the
Act. According to the court, the Section 30(b) exemption was not
meant to frustrate the purposes of the Exchange Act, but merely to
"[relieve] the Commission of the impossible task of enforcing Amer-
ican securities law upon persons whom it could not subject to the
sanctions of the Act for actions upon which it could not bring its
investigatory powers to bear." 88 If, as seems evident, Schoenbaum did
adopt a philosophy of protective jurisdiction, the important considera-
tion is whether a substantial danger is posed by a particular transac-
tion. Thus the requirement of substantiality for protective jurisdiction
should be defined with respect to the significance of the harm threat-
ened and not in relation to the importance of a domestic act in the
overall transaction.
The Second Circuit was quickly given the opportunity to clarify
the scope of section 30(b) in Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd." There, the
plaintiff, a stockholder in Dreyfus Corp., brought a stockholder deriva-
tive suit to recover short-swing "insider" profits made by the de-
fendant, a Canadian mutual fund, on purchases and sales of Dreyfus
common stock, listed on an American exchange. The district court, in
a decision antedating Schoenbaum, found the place of purchase and
sale to be the place of the wrong. Since the wrong occurred within the
United States, section 30(b) was ruled inapplicable." Distinguishing
Kook as involving transactions effected outside the United States on a
stantial act within the United States" in connection with the alleged violation
before an American court may have jurisdiction over foreign transactions. See,
also Kook v. Crang, 185 [sic] F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Id. at 91,680.
81 In Schoenbaum "a broadly protective jurisdiction of almost limitless potential
was asserted in imperial style." Becker, supra note 70, at 241.
82 For a discussion and analysis of the meager legislative history of § 30(b), see
Goldman & Magrino, supra note 33, at 1017-21.
88 405 F.2d at 207-08. The court stated that the purpose of * 30(b) is twofold:
(1) to allow persons in the securities business' to conduct transactions in securities out-
side the United States without complying with the "burdensome" reporting requirements
of the Exchange Act and without being subject to its regulatory provisions, except
insofar as the Commission finds it necessary and appropriate to regulate such transac-
tions in order to prevent evasion of the Exchange Act; and (2) to keep the SEC out
of the business of regulating foreign security exchanges, unless the SEC deems it necessary
in order to prevent evasion. Id. at 207.
84 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). The decision in
Roth was handed down six months after the Circuit's first decision in Schoenbaum and
three weeks prior to the second.
85 279 F, Supp. 935, 936-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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foreign exchange, the Second Circuit affirmed, on the basis that the
transaction had an American situs." Since Roth came within the juris-
diction of the United States regardless of whether the "territorial" or
"protective" theory was applied, the court avoided discussion of the
problem.
In Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp.," however, the court did
address the problem, and attempted to interpret the extent of the
Schoenbaum holding. The plaintiff, a British citizen and resident, had
purchased stock not registered or traded in the United States from the
defendants, also foreigners, relying on representations which had been
made in England. An agreement to purchase the stock had been signed
in New York; nevertheless, a substantially identical agreement had
been executed by the same parties twenty days later in England. One
defendant, a defunct Bermudian closed-end investment company had
been registered previously with the SEC. Plaintiff alleged violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule .1013-5 thereunder.
The Finch. court found Schoenbaum dispositive on the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. Acknowledging that Schoenbaum subordi-
nated the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic
legislation to the need to protect American investors, the court recited
the holding in Schoenbaum, which allowed extraterritorial application
"at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors." 88 However, the court interpreted Schoenbaum as
precluding extraterritorial application when, as in Finch,
(1) the substance of the allegedly fraudulent conduct oc-
curred outside the United States; (2) the parties are pre-
dominantly foreign; (3) the subject shares are securities in a
foreign corporation neither registered nor traded on a na-
tional securities exchange; and (4) there is no showing of
any domestic injury . . . despite the existence of other less
meaningful American-based facts and events."
86
 Section 30(b) is inapplicable because when the Fund bought and sold the
securities in question on the New York Stock Exchange, utilizing New York
City stock brokers to execute its orders to buy and sell, and made payment for
the purchases through a New York bank, it was not transacting a "business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States." Kook v. Crang . . .
dealt with a totally different situation where the transactions were effected
outside the United States on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
405 F.2d at 422. See Note, 10 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 150, 151-52 (1971).
87 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (per Tenney, J.).
88
 Id. at 1349, quoting from Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (1968).
89
 316 F. Supp. at 1349 (emphasis added). These "less meaningful American-based
facts and events" were said to "partially bridge the jurisdictional gap." Id. at 1347.
They included the original execution in New York; an "offshore" connection with the
United States, based upon the predominantly American citizenship of the Bermuda cor-
porate defendant's officers and directors; and the "substantial control" exercised by a
United States corporation over the Bermuda corporation. Id.
1242
OFFSHORE MUTUAL FUNDS AND THE 1934 ACT
Thus the decision in Finch is compatible with the previously sug-
gested interpretation of Schoenbaum." Before protective jurisdiction
will be asserted, an act threatening substantial harm to American
markets or investors must be present. Although the Finch court did
not attempt to confine extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act
to the narrow situation of Schoenbaum," it nevertheless, in the first
application of Schoenbaum, did not extend its holding. At least in situa-
tions where no domestic party, registered security or domestic injury
was involved, the Finch court ruled that it was not the intent of Con-
gress to make transactions subject to the provisions of the Exchange
Act °2 In essence, the Court endorsed the philosophy of protective
jurisdiction and began to define, albeit by exclusion, the situations
under which that jurisdiction should be exercised.
In respect to the territorial aspects of the case the court observed
that, despite the presence of some insignificant domestic acts, the sub-
stance of the transaction had occurred outside the United States.
Therefore, the court ruled that there existed no territorial jurisdiction.
The thrust of this observation is that a court does not have territorial
jurisdiction unless necessary and substantial aspects of the transaction
in question occur within the United.States. Thus one of the important
generalizations which can be drawn from the Finch decision is that the
sine qua non of jurisdiction, territorial or protective, is a necessary and
substantial act. However, in order to resolve the question of territorial
jurisdiction, the issue is whether a substantial act has occurred within
the United States; in order to resolve the question of protective juris-
diction, the issue is whether the transaction involves an act threatening
substantial harm to domestic markets or investors.
This two-part test for determining jurisdiction was clearly articu-
lated in the next case presenting the problem of defining "jurisdiction"
under section 30(b)—Investment Properties International, Ltd. v.
1.0.S., Ltd." In that case, the plaintiffs, a Canadian corporation, in
" See pp. 1238-41 supra.
01 Wt is not suggested that the Act's extraterritorial protection be extended
only to frauds involving transactions in securities of publicly held corporations
which are traded on a securities market.
316 F. Supp. at 1349. The Finch court held that it was "without subject matter jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 1349. The court did not find jurisdiction and then decline to exercise it
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a possibility that was suggested by Schoen-
baum. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 209 n.5 (2d Cir. 1968).
U2 It should be noted that Finch is the first decision since Kook to find a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction upon careful consideration of § 30(b), thus delineating at
least some circumstances which will not allow application of the Exchange Act. A previous
case, however, had found the Exchange Act inapplicable, citing 30(b) and Kook. See
Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec, L. Rep. ¶ 92,535 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1969).
03 0970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21,
1971) (per Frankel, J.).
The court refused a preliminary injunction. The subsequent history of the litigation
is outlined in Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. IDS, Ltd., Docket No. 72-1060 (2d Cir.
Apr. 21, 1972), and is summarized as follows. The Second Circuit affirmed without an
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which defendant owned "virtually all" of the voting common stock,
and a group of its subsidiaries alleged multiple claims under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs asserted that a series of intercorpo-
rate transactions had been part of a scheme to defraud. The scheme
allegedly was intended to impose risks and losses on certain IOS sub-
sidiaries (including the plaintiffs) and their shareholders, reserving
profits to IOS and its other subsidiaries.
In determining whether it had jurisdiction, the court applied a
two-pronged test: "First, has the allegedly unlawful transaction 'oc-
curred' in the United States? Second, if the transaction has occurred
outside the United States does the [Exchange] Act nevertheless reach
•it?"" In other words, the inquiry is first whether the transaction was
"without" the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and, if the
answer is affirmative," second, whether the transaction was never-
theless within the "protective" jurisdiction of the United States. In
discussing the second question the court did not rely on section 30(b).
Rather, it articulated a test for protective jurisdiction:
[T]he main consideration appears to be: does the transaction
have some significant impact on the domestic securities mar-
ket or on domestic investors, and is extraterritorial applica-
tion therefore necessary to protect securities trading in the
United States and/or American investors? If there is no such
domestic impact from a substantially. foreign transaction,
United States' courts have no reason to become involved, and
compelling reason not to become involved, in the burdens of
enforcement and the delicate problems of foreign relations
and international economic policy that extraterritorial ap-
plication may entail."
opinion. Plaintiffs then sought to depose certain of defendants' Officers, with the exami-
nation limited to the threshold issues of standing and jurisdiction. The district court va-
cated plaintiffs' notices of deposition "without prejudice to further discovery if it is
determined that this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action." Id. at
2763. The Second Circuit held the vacation to be an abuse of discretion since it "places
[the] case in limbo, from which there is no appeal. To move forward at all . . . [plain-
tiffs] must prove jurisdictional facts at trial; to accomplish that, however, discovery may
well be needed." Id. at 2765-66. The Second Circuit granted a petition for mandamus and
directed the district judge to vacate his vacation. The Second Circuit stated that dis-
covery related to standing and subject matter jurisdiction must be aimed at the produc-
tion of factual matter other than that which appears in the lower court opinions. Id. at
2767. Compare Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966) (doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies precludes application of the § 30(b) exemption so as to
include the SEC right to investigate a registered broker-dealer to - determine whether
violations have occurred).
1:4 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 93,011 at 90,734.
95 The court found that none of the transactions had occurred in the United States.
The court did not view Schoenbaum as completely eliminating the need for significant
.acts in order to assert territorial jurisdiction: "So far as our securities laws are con-
cerned, no significant events . . . are shown to have occurred within the United States."
Id. at 90,737. Although the plaintiffs had cited American aspects of the scheme, the
court did not strain to find a transnational scheme.
' 96 Id. at 90,735.
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Noting that both parties were foreign corporationsr that none of the
securities had been traded on any domestic exchange or over any do-
mestic counter, and that shares had not been sold to citizens or resi-
dents of the United States," the court denied a preliminary injunction:
The court ruled that there was lacking a sufficient act within the United
States and that there was "no showing of a basis for jurisdiction in
concern for American investors.""
Although Investment Properties International, like Finch, did not
find subject matter jurisdiction, the court again framed its initial in-
quiry in terms of the legislative intent to apply the securities laws
extraterritorially when necessary to protect American interests. No at-
tempt was made to confine Schoenbaion merely to situations involving
both registered securities and detriment to the interests of American
investors. The existence of a "significant impact on the domestic se-
curities markets or on domestic investors" was deemed sufficient to
justify extraterritorial application.'"
97 Although some of the parties plaintiff were American corporation; id. at 90,726-
27, the court stressed that "IPI, the crucial party claiming to be harmed by the alleged
frauds, is a foreign corporation. . ." Id. at 90,736. Evidently the indirect harm to the
American plaintiffs Was viewed as insignificant.
I/8 The court thought it unimportant that officers, directors and employees of IOS
and its subsidiaries did own shares despite their American citizenship. Id, at 90,736.
Furthermore, the court determined that the purchase of shares in the plaintiff corpora-
tion by plaintiff's lawyers did not demonstrate a need to protect American investors:
The fact that through a concerted effort private parties can arrange for the ar-
rival of some IPI shares in American hands, in spite of the efforts of105 and all' '
of its affiliates to prevent this from happening, is scarcely a basis for the jurisdic-
tion plaintiffs invoke.
Id. at 90,736 n.17.
99 Id. at 90,736. The court also stated: "[P]laintiffs cannot claim that jurisdiction
is necessary to effectuate one of the Act's central purposes, 'to regulate the stock ex-
changes and the relationships of the investing public to corporations which invite in-
vestment by listing on such exchanges.' " Id. It is submitted that purchases of registered
American stocks for the portfolio of an' offshore fund could necessitate regulation of the
issuance of shares in* the funds in order to. protect "the relationships of the • investing
public to corporations which invite investment by listing ...." See pp. 1249-53 infra.
100 Similarly, in Manus v. The Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [Current] CCH. Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 93,299 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1971), although not reaching the issue, the Court noted
that subject matter jurisdiction apparently was lacking. The court pointed to the fact
that the parties were aliens and that the principal transaction, involving the sale of un-
registered common stock of an American corporation, had occurred in England. No al-
legation or factual determination showed the transaction to be "detrimental to the
interests of domestic investors or of the domestic securities market." Id. at 91,650.
An SEC examiner has recently considered the scope of regulation permissible under
the Exchange Act in IOS, Ltd. (S.A.), SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-2157
(March 14, 1972) as reported in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,637. In• 1965;
respondent IOS, a Panamanian holding company which prior to 1967 was registered as
a broker-dealer under the Exchange Act, acquired the assets of a large broker-dealer
and placed those assets in a wholly-owned subsidiary, respondent WC. IPC is presently
known as CIP, Inc., and is registered as a' broker-dealer. IOS had been subject to prior
SEC proceedings. Settlement had. prohibited portfolio transactions of IOS and its related
foreign funds unless the orders concerning such transactions were placed with an inde-
pendent, nonaffiliated entity outside the United States or with a United States brokerage
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Recently the section 30(b) exemption has been considered outside
the Second Circuit. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.', 1°1 plaintiffs,
Missouri citizens, brought a class action alleging violaton of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In 1968 the defendant Molson, a Canadian
corporator, made a tender offer to acquire the shares of non-United
States shareholders of defendant Anthes, also a Canadian corporation.
At the time, neither Molson nor Anthes shares were registered with
the SEC; since registration is a requisite to a legal exchange offer, the
offer was not extended to United States resident shareholders. Plain-
tiffs, American shareholders of Anthes, claimed that they had been in-
duced to refrain from selling their shares by defendants' representation
that, after ,expiration of the tender offer, the United States resident
shareholders of Anthes would be treated on an equivalent basis, net
after-taxes, as the non-United States resident shareholders of Anthes.
The alleged misrepresentation in Travis involved the use of inter-
state facilities. However, each use in connection with the misrepresen-
tation had been initiated by the plaintiffs; although the defendants had
firm located, or having branch offices, outside the United States. A partner in a brokerage
firm with which IOS had done business was prevailed upon to form another brokerage
firm, Arthur Lipper Corporation ("Lipper Corporation"), with offices in London and
Geneva. In return for substantial business from 105, the founder of Lipper Corporation
understood that the corporation was required to "give up" 50% of the commissions
generated by IOS business to IPC. "A 'give up' is in effect a splitting of the commission
received by the executing broker with another broker designated by the customer to
receive a certain portion of that commission." [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fi 78,637
at 81,354 n.11.. Various over-the-counter transactions were executed by IOS subsidiaries
and $1;275,000 was remitted to IPC by Lipper Corporation. Adequate disclosure of
the give-up arrangement was never furnished to the subsidiary offshore funds dealing
with Lipper Corporation or to the shareholders of those funds. .
The examiner found that the inadequately disclosed arrangements violated Lipper
Corporation's obligation, to deal fairly with its customers and constituted a fraud in
violation of § 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, since the commissions charged the
funds could have been reduced by 50% in place of the remissions to IPC. Id. at 81,354-
58. The respondents contended that the Exchange Act did not apply to the relationship
between 105 and its related offshore funds. However, the examiner found that respon-
dents' willful aiding and abetting of a registered broker-dealer in its ' willful violation
of §.10(b) and Rule 10b-5 sufficed to bring IOS conduct within SEC jurisdiction under
the Exchange Act. Id. at 81,360. The examiner noted further that the securities trans-
actions on behalf of the funds were executed on domestic over-the-counter markets. Since
the fraudulent scheme necessarily utilized United States over-the-counter markets, sig-
nificant acts in the United States existed and application of the § 30(b) exemption was
thus precluded, id. at 81,360-61, and the Exchange Act was applied to measure IOS's
fiduciary obligations to its related foreign funds.
In the course of his opinion, the examiner acknowledged Investment Properties In-
ternational's focus on "whether the transactions have 'some significant impact on the
domestic securities market or on domestic investors. . . .'" Id. at 81,360. However, after
reciting that case's dual test for subject matter jurisdiction, see supra p. 1244, the ex-
aminer relied on territorial conceptions, concluding that discussion of protective juris-
diction was inappropriate since the fraudulent overcharges were inextricably tied to
transactions on American markets. Id. at 81,360-61. The examiner's decision is being
appealed. Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1972, at .12, col. 3.
101 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 	 93,303 (E.D. Mo. June 24,' 1971) (per
Wangelin, J.).
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initiated use of interstate facilities, they had not done so in connection
with the alleged violation. Although the terms of the exchange had not
been agreed upon within the United States, the ultimate exchange of
plaintiffs' shares for cash had occurred in St. Louis; however, at the
time of the sale, the plaintiffs no longer believed the alleged misrepre-
sentations.
Relying heavily on Schoenbaum, the court accepted the position
that the Exchange Act was not limited to territorial application. Never-
theless, it dismissed the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdic-
tion."' In reaching this result, the Travis court examined the extra-
territorial scope of the Exchange Act as enunciated in Schoenbaum.
According to the court, Schoenbaum "set forth the limited situa-
tions in which the securities acts have extraterritorial application . . . .
[F] irst, where a domestic purchaser buys foreign securities on an
American exchange, and second, where an improper foreign transaction
in American securities affects the domestic securities rnarket."m The
court in Travis further stated that Schoenbaum clearly required " 'a
necessary and substantial act within the United States' in connection
with the alleged violation before an American court may have jurisdic-
tion over foreign transactions."'" Finding that the defendants had
committed no necessary and substantial act within the country, the
court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction.
On its facts, the decision in Travis is compatible with either a
territorial or protective definition of jurisdiction. The only significant
domestic acts by defendants were their communications advising the
plaintiffs of the true facts and the exchange of plaintiffs' shares for
cash. Neither of these acts was connected with the alleged misrepre-
sentation. On the contrary, the former act dispelled the misapprehen-
sion so that, at the time of the latter act, the plaintiffs were not being
deceived. Thus there existed no necessary and substantial domestic
acts, .requisite to an assertion of territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, there was no threat of substantial harm to domestic
markets or investors within the guidelines set forth in Schoenbaum. In
Travis, no foreign securities had been listed on American exchanges.
Moreover, while the alleged misrepresentation may have substantially
harmed American investors, the harm did not flow from foreign trans-
actions in American securities. Thus, absent a nexus between the for-
eign transaction and the maintenance of fair and honest securities mar-
kets, it was not necessary for the court to exert jurisdiction under the
Schoenbaum rationale. Since the court in Travis restricted protective
jurisdiction to those situations specified in Schoenbaum, it failed to
discuss the implication of Investment Properties International that the
102 The court also stated that it did not have jurisdiction because there was a
failure to state a claim under Rule 10b-5; in addition, the court found that venue was
improper.
103
 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,303 at 91,679-80.
104 Id. at 91,680.
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protection of American investors, standing alone, may necessitate pro-
tective jurisdiction.
The most disturbing aspect of the Travis decision is its apparent
insistence that, before protective jurisdiction, as defined by Schoen-
baum, can be asserted, the court must first find a necessary and sub-
stantial act within the United States. This view follows only if the
Schoenbaum decision is interpreted to mean that registration of a se-
curity on, a national exchange is a "necessary and substantial" act.
However, it was previously suggested that this extremely narrow read-
ing of Schoenbaum should be rejected;"' it is a reversion to the pre-
sumption of a purely territorial application of the Exchange Act.
Schoenbaum rejected this presumption and endorsed the idea that the
Act applies when the requisites of protective jurisdiction are present.
While protective jurisdiction probably retains the standard of substan-
tiality, it is suggested that the term "substantial," in this context,
refers to the magnitude of harm threatened to domestic markets or
investors and not to the significance of a domestic act in relation to the
overall transaction.
By way of summary, the courts in the Second Circuit have ex-
pressly disavowed the early decisions leaning toward a purely terri-
torial application of the Exchange Act. The earlier section 30(b) cases
adopted the presumption that legislation is to apply territorially, unless
a contrary intent is clearly manifest. In adopting the territorial con-
cept, Kook v. Crang articulated a test for jurisdiction: an act both
necessary and substantial in the context of the overall transaction must
occur within the United States before there exists territorial jurisdic-
tion. However, the courts, as illustrated by Ferraioli v. Cantor, moved
away from this position, finding transactions "within" the United
States on the basis of acts which were of questionable substantiality:
jurisdiction was predicated upon insignificant, but necessary, acts.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit expressly re-
jected the presumption of territoriality. Following the spirit of this
disavowal, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
has not attempted to restrict Schoenbaum to its facts. In Investment
Properties International the protective theory of jurisdiction was af-
firmed. Under this theory, the issue is whether a transaction is within
the territorial or protective jurisdiction of the United States. To deter-
mine whether a transaction is within the territorial jurisdiction, the
court has revived the requirement enunciated by Kook that a neces-
sary and substantial act must occur within the United States. The sub-
stantiality standard has also been suggested for the exercise of protec-
tive jurisdiction. However, it is submitted that where a court asserts
protective jurisdiction, the question of whether an act is substantial
should be answered by reference to its potential for harm rather than
by reference to the significance of the act in the overall transaction.
The reason for this interpretation is that protective jurisdiction is con-
los See pp. 1239-41 supra.
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cerned with the impact which foreign activities may have upon domes-
tic markets; unlike territorial jurisdiction, it is not concerned with the
relative magnitude of a domestic event.
Outside the Second Circuit, the only decision fully to articulate
an opinion on the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act is
the Travis decision. There the court concurred with the Second Cir-
cuit's philosophy of protective jurisdiction. However, the Travis court
would require as a prerequisite to assuming protective jurisdiction a
necessary and substantial domestic act. It has been noted that this re-
quirement is inconsistent with the spirit of the Schoenbaum decision,
whch first propounded the argument that the Exchange Act should be
applied protectively. Since the Travis decision is regressive, it should
not be followed.
II. APPLICATION TO OFFSHORE FUNDS
Thus far, the discussion has not been directed specifically at off-
shore mutual funds; it has concerned those persons transacting busi-
ness in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States. Mutual
funds are somewhat unique in that they engage in two distinct types
of securities transactions. First, the fund as a dealer engages in trans-
actions in. shares of its portfolio companies; second, the fund as an
issuer is engaged in the distribution and redemption of its own shares.
To determine the extent to which either of these activities can be reg-
ulated under the Exchange Act, it may be helpful to reiterate the
guidelines for protective jurisdiction propounded by Schoenbaum.
Under Schoenbaum, the extraterritorial application of the Ex-
change Act for the purpose of protecting American investors and mar-
kets is justified in two situations: (1) where domestic investors have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and (2) where
foreign transactions in American securities threaten substantial harm
to domestic markets. An offshore fund's transactions in its own shares,
when viewed in isolation, clearly are not within the scope of the guide-
lines. By definition, the shares of an offshore fund are (1) not Ameri-
can securities, (2) not sold to American investors, and (3) not regis-
tered on an American exchange.'" Thus the contours of protective
jurisdiction established by Schoenbaum do not encompass transactions
by an offshore fund qua issuer.
The result may be different when a fund engages in transactions
as a dealer. In this situation, the question of subject matter jurisdiction
depends on a variety of factors including: (1) whether the securities
traded are domestic or foreign; (2) whether the securities are regis-
tered with the SEC; (3) whether the securities are listed on a national
exchange; (4) the nationality of the other party to the transaction;
and (5) the locus of the transaction. If the transaction occurs within
the United States, American courts clearly have territorial jurisdiction.
100 See p. 1225 supra.
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Where the allegedly unlawful transaction is foreign, Schoenbaum would
extend protective jurisdiction only when the securities involved are
American and the transaction threatens substantial harm to domestic
markets.'" None of the previously discussed decisions address the
problem of specifying the foreign transactions threatening substantial
harm to domestic markets. However, Schoenbaum held that protective
jurisdiction exists where a foreign transaction involves foreign securi-
ties registered on a domestic exchange. If this is so then, a fortiori, a
court has protective jurisdiction when a foreign transaction involves
domestic securities registered with a domestic exchange. The import
of Schoenbaum, it has been suggested, is that a court should assume
jurisdiction when there is a significant nexus between the foreign trans-
action and the maintenance of fair and honest securities markets.'"
This nexus is established when the securities involved are registered
on an American exchange or are actively traded on the over-the-counter
markets. In these situations, the interest of domestic investors is sub-
stantial enough to warrant United States regulation.
Thus it has been concluded that,, when viewed in isolation, an off-
shore mutual fund's activities as an issuer of securities do not confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court. On the other hand, when
a fund acts as a dealer in securities, courts do have subject matter juris-
diction in some cases. A final and important issue remains in those
cases where a fund continuously trades in securities of domestic com-
panies registered on an American exchange: whether offshore mutual
funds, trading in domestic portfolio securities, come within the pro-
tective jurisdiction of the United States when they commit fraud or
other misconduct in connection with transactions in their own securi-
ties. In essence, the question is, do a fund's activities as a dealer justify
extending jurisdiction over its activities as an issuer? The obvious
jurisdictional barrier is that fraud in the issuance of securities is not
directly connected with the activities giving rise to protective jurisdic-
tion—the portfolio transactions. This situation is clearly not within
the Schoenbaum guidelines, yet it is indisputable that the extensive
holdings of offshore funds represent the possibility of substantial harm
to American securities markets."' Arguably, the funds' activities in
raising capital are inextricably intertwined with their investments in
American securities.
The only case to date dealing with this problem is SEC v. United
Financial Group, Inc.," 0 in which the SEC charged a large offshore
complex with fraud and record-keeping violations, requesting a perma-
nent injunction against future violations and the appointment of a
receiver. One of the defendants, an American, had dominated and con-
trolled the defendant offshore mutual funds from within the United
107 See p. 1239 supra.
los See pp. 1239-41 supra; 1253 infra.
100 See pp. 1225-26 supra.
110 Civil No. 72-41 (D. Ore., Sled Jan. 17, 1972).
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States.'" These funds were created "to take advantage of technical
provisions of [United States] tax laws"; the millions of dollars of for-
eign capital raised by these offshore funds were reinvested in real estate
and securities in the United States."' Although it was the policy of the
funds not to sell to Americans, incidental foreign sales to three Ameri-
cans did occur,'" despite precautions taken by the defendants."'
The district court granted the SEC's request for a preliminary in-
junction and appointed a temporary receiver, pendente lite."' The
court's findings emphasized the need to prevent 'substantial and ir-
reparable injury" to investors and creditors, both domestic and for-
eign."' The injury to domestic investors to which the court referred
did not appear' to be the injury to the three American purchasers; 117
rather, the court seemed concerned about the more general harm to
"the ability of American issues of securities to raise capital abroad
resulting from defendants' fraudulent operations . . . .""" The court
further emphasized the danger to the confidence of foreign investors
111
 Id. Findings of Fact at 2, 11 1 (Feb. 16, 1972). UFG is a Delaware corporation.
The defendants also include other American and foreign individuals as well as American
corporations.
It is not unusual for Americans to control offshore funds. See SEC Institutional
Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, ch. 7 at 882-84
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study]. Cf. note 89 supra.
112
 Civil No. 72-41 (D. Ore., filed Jan. 17, 1972), Findings of Fact at 4, 11 16 (Feb.
16, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Findings of Fact].
113
 Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Appointment of Receiver Pendente Lite in
SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc. at 15-17 thereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Supp.
Memorandum]. The SEC argued that it was not the policy of the offshore funds to
refund money to American investors, but to offer alternative investments. Id. at 16.
The SEC did not specify the number of American purchasers; the number three ap-
pears in a Letter from Garry P. McMurry, defense attorney, Feb. 29, 1972, on file in
the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review Office [hereinafter cited as
Letter from Garry P. McMurry].
114
 These preventive measures were not emphasized by the SEC but are outlined
in Defendants' Memorandum on Order to Show Cause in SEC v. United Financial
Group, Inc. at 2-3 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Memorandum],
118
 Preliminary Injunction issued Feb. 16, 1972; Order Appointing Receiver Pendente
Lite issued Feb. 16, 1972; Notice of Appeal filed Feb. 18, 1972.
113 Findings of Fact at 6, 11 21 (Feb. 16, 1972). See also id. at 4, V 17, stressing the
"adverse effect upon American securities, securities markets, investors and creditors . ."
The SEC argued that the prospectuses and other sales literature distributed by the UFG
companies had emphasized that investments would be made in securities of United
States corporations. The SEC argued that "[t]hese investments have had a substantial
effect on the securities of American companies." Plaintiff's Supp. Memorandum, supra
note 113, at 7. See id. at 7-9.
117
 Cf. Letter from Garry P. McMurry, supra note 113. See also note 98 supra.
Findings of Fact, supra note 112, at 6, 11 20, however, reads in part:
Defendants have used the facilities and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
to make some sales of securities to citizens and resident [sic] of the United
States . .
118
 Findings of Fact, supra note 112, at 6, 11 21. The SEC argued that, even absent
any sales to Americans, the use of the mails and other interstate facilities was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction. See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 114, at 12.
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in registered United - States: investment vehicles and reputable offshore
funds. The implication was that the investment of foreign funds in
American .Securities. confers "protective" jurisdiction to regulate the
operations of an offshore mutual fund owned by an American holding
Company." Although the decision is ambiguous, the insubstantial na-
ture of the domestic contacts 12° compels the conclusion that the court
asserted protective jurisdiction. The implications of the decision must
thus be measured in the light of Schoenbaum.
Under the spirit of Schoenbaum, extraterritorial application of the
Exchange Act clearly seems permissible when the allegedly fraudulent
foreign activities directly related to transactions in American securities
present the threat of significant harm to the American securities mar-
kets. To decide otherwise would exempt a significant source of poten-
tial harm; offshore mutual funds would be allowed to engage in grossly
fraudulent distribution of their shares, thus predicating the stability
of American portfolio stocks, and perhaps the domestic markets in
general, upon the continued viability of unregulated and unreliable
offshore mutual funds.
However, the facts of United Financial Group are significantly
different from those in Schoenbaum. Schoenbaum involved a threat to
American stockholders through fraudulent transactions involving stock
registered with the SEC and traded upon an American exchange. The
alleged fraud in United Financial Group involved stock unregistered
and untraded in the United States, and did not involve American in-
vestors; that is, the fraud was connected with the fund's activities as
an issuer and not with its portfolio transactions. Thus the decision
seems to expand significantly the Schoenbaum decision. However, it is
compatible with the Schoenbaum rationale that the Exchange Act
should apply extraterritorially when necessary to protect American
investors.
Although no direct harm to stock registered and traded within the
United States or to American investors is apparent in the sale of shares
of offshore mutual funds, a potential indirect harm to American securi-
ties and their shareholders is recognizable. This indirect harm would
be manifest in the loss of confidence in both American mutual funds
and reputable offshore funds; investment in creditable funds could be
curtailed to the substantial detriment of portfolio stocks and the mar-
ket in general. The relatively large financial impact which offshore
funds may have on the American market may justify the inference
that Congress intended that these funds be regulated in order to pro-
119 For the first time a court of the United States has stated that the investment
of foreign funds in the American marketplace creates jurisdiction in the S.E.C.
to control the operations of an off-shore mutual fund which is owned by an
American holding company with offices in California.
Letter from Garry P. McMurry, supra note 113.
1" The court does note the American contacts of the defendants and refers to
.domestic friudulent operations. See, e.g., Findings of Fact, supra note 112 at 6, 11 21.
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tect the American market. 121 As previously noted, the important con-
sideration in determining whether a case involving a predominantly
foreign transaction is properly within the protective jurisdiction of the
United States would seem to be whether there exists a substantial
connection between the alleged wrong and the necessity of maintaining
fair and honest securities markets. Both foreign transactions in Ameri-
can securities and domestic transactions in foreign securities registered
on exchanges have this nexus; but surely these transactions are not
exhaustive. Fraudulent behavior in connection with the issuance of off-
shore fund securities may well adversely affect the financial stability
of the fund. When, as is often the case, a fund holds a significant
amount of domestic securities, traded on domestic exchanges, its finan-
cial incompetence portends substantial harm to domestic markets and
investors. While the potential for harm is still largely unfulfilled, pro-
spective preventive regulation of the industry may be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Given the lack of presently available alternatives, some form of
domestic regulation of offshore mutual funds seems necessary. The Ex-
change Act appears to be a viable domestic instrument for the needed
protection of American securities markets because it contains, in sec-
tion 30(b), an express provision which exempts certain extraterritorial
securities transactions from regulation. Thus, the Exchange Act can
provide both the needed regulation and statutory exemption.
The preliminary barrier to application of the exemptive provision
of the Exchange Act is in determining whether an offshore mutual
fund qualifies as a "person insofar as he transacts a business in securi-
ties" within the meaning of section 30(b). If an offshore fund is not
included in this phrase, the statutorily mandated exemption is inap-
plicable; selective exemption based upon a statutory provision would,
therefore, be foreclosed. It has been submitted that reasoned judicial
evaluation should determine the precise extraterritorial scope of the
Exchange Act. This can be done in a more considered manner by fo-
cusing on the underlying protective purpose of the Act through inter-
pretation of the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United States."
The two problems involved in interpreting the phrase "without
the jurisdiction of the United States" are: 1) defining the term "juris-
diction," and 2) if a protective interpretation is adopted, determining
the scope of protective jurisdiction. The protective theory of jurisdic-
tion focuses upon the harm threatened to American markets or inves-
tors. It is difficult to hypothesize circumstances which would not affect
the domestic market to some degree; for this reason, advocates of a
purely territorial interpretation argue that a protective interpretation
121 Cf. Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds,
83 Harv. L. Rev. 404, 438-40 (1969).
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would render the exemption virtually a meaningless superfluity. 122
However, the necessity of implementing the primary purpose for enact-
ing the Exchange Act—the protection of the domestic securities mar-
ket—militates against adoption of this view. The primary protective
purpose of the Exchange Act should not be thwarted by a restrictive
reading of the word "jurisdiction" in Section 30(b).
Under the protective interpretation, the courts must still ask
whether Congress intended to make the statute applicable to a partic-
ular transaction.' If a transaction does not fall clearly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the extraterritorial scope
of the Exchange Act must be determined through a judicial evalua-
tion of whether the harm threatened to American securities markets
or investors requires the imposition of regulatory action. Absent a
substantial need for the protection of American interests, the section
30(b) exemption should apply; but it should be limited to those for-
eign transactions which, while within the technical jurisdiction of the
United States under the Exchange Act; are of insignificant impact.
The concept of substantiality of harm is a flexible standard which
considers actions in the context in which they occur. 124
The extensive portfolio holdings of offshore mutual funds make
these funds a potential source of harm. The difficult problem is speci-
fying those activities of offshore mutual funds which require regula-
tion. Resolution of this problem requires a consideration of both the
substantiality of the harm threatened and the likelihood of its occur-
rence. Such an evaluation should consider the impact of the entire
offshore mutual fund industry, rather than the lesser impact of a single
offshore mutual fund. The disreputable behavior of one fund may im-
plicate more reputable funds, thus engendering a lack of confidence
in the entire industry.
Another primary consideration is the preservation of interna-
tional harmony. Retaliatory regulation of registered American issuers
by foreign governments is a distinct and noxious possibility. However,
prudent judicial protective regulation concentrating initially on the
122 Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69
Colum. L. Rev. 94, 104 (1969).
This protective interpretation would not render the § 30(b) exemption superfluous.
The SEC's rule-making power under § 30(b) would, in effect, be a power to override or
preclude a judicial finding of insubstantiality of harm if such a finding, in the SEC's
view, would prevent the extraterritorial application of a provision of the Exchange Act
in order to protect American securities markets.
125
 Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
124 Cf. Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: To-
wards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 Va.
L. Rev. 1015, 1020 (1969). The authors suggest that the legislative history of li 30(b)
supports what is actually a protective interpretation. They suggest that SEC rules
promulgated under other sections of the Exchange Act may impliedly serve to prevent
evasion of the Exchange Act and thus be viewed, effectively, if not formally, as § 30(b)
rules. Such an interpretation is close to the focus on the protective purpose of the
Exchange Act herein advocated.
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most grievous threats—probably section 10(b) violations—should not
disrupt international relations. As it becomes clear that the sole reason
for extraterritorial application is the prevention of significant harm to
American markets,'" other nations will be encouraged to develop—as
many are already doing—their own regulatory systems, not in retribu-
tion, but as a protection for investors."' Thus, the establishment of a
de facto minimum standard of international regulation would be en-
couraged. As meaningful regulation by foreign countries increases, the
necessity for protection through American regulation would decrease.
The probabilities of substantial harm to American markets would be
diminished by foreign regulation and the exemption would find in-
creased application. Alternatively, the doctrine of forum non coveniens
could be used by the courts to decline the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in those instances where meaningful foreign regulation al-
ready existed and in which foreign regulation was more appropriate.
While an extension of American regulation would insure meaning-
ful regulation of offshore fund activities and protect both the American
market and foreign investors, it does not placate the fear of capital
drainage which exists in many countries; neither does it solve balance
of payment considerations."' Both of these factors motivate foreign
countries to regulate American issuers and encourage the establishment
125
 A desirable effect may be increased confidence by foreign investors in the reg-
ulated funds. Cf. SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 111, pt. 1, at XVI.
125 For a discussion of securities regulation in the "most important securities mar-
ket outside the United States," see Knauss, Securities Regulation in the United Kingdom:
A Comparison with United States Practice, 5 Vend. J. Transnat'l L. 49 (1971).
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 The problem involves bringing offshore funds "onshore" in the regulatory sense,
while still providing tax advantages to foreigners. See SEC Institutional Investor Study,
supra note 111, at 954. The SEC has suggested that one method of solving this problem
"would be to establish entities through which nonresident foreign investors could receive
the same tax advantages by investing in domestic registered funds as they currently
obtain through the purchase of shares in an offshore fund. . . . Alternatively, a separate
registered investment company could be created and designed to appeal specifically to
foreign investors." Id., pt. 1, at XVI-XVII. The SEC has established an interagency
task force to explore the possible solutions. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 9285 (Aug. If, 1971). While these methods would serve to bolster foreign confi-
dence, the present holdings of offshore funds could still have an undesirable impact.
The impact could result if Investors in offshore funds rushed to reinvest in onshore
funds, causing heavy offshore fund sales of a widely held specific portfolio stock. For
this reason American securities markets still could face potential harm. Further, since
the purpose of this proposal would be merely to neutralize the offshore fund's competi-
tive advantage, the continued potentially harmful involvement of unregulated offshore
funds in American securities markets appears to be conceded. However, if such a statutory
scheme were adopted, the Exchange Act, and 30(b) specifically, could be extended as
herein advocated in order to fill this regulatory void.
The suggestion of the SEC suffers from a further defect. While the SEC professes to
question the justification of those foreign regulations apparently based on protection of
foreign capital markets or balance of payments considerations instead of investor protec-
tion (SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 111, at 950), the SEC states that the
proposal's "net result would be beneficial both to foreign investor protection and the
United States securities market, as well as to the United States balance of payments."
Id., pt. 1 at XVI.
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of "national funds."'" As the home of the most sophisticated securities
market,' the United States should endorse the view that "[m]avements
of capital between countries should not be restricted unnecessarily."'"
A free flow of capital would probably lead to substantial investment
in American investment companies and American stocks. However,
countries which are capital poor might not view this exodus of capital
favorably. This problem could be partially alleviated by freeing the
sale of shares of foreign investment companies in the Untied States
from present strict restrictions;' 3° provided, of course, that such is-
suers are meaningfully regulated by the domiciliary nation. Neverthe-
less, prudent extension of those provisions of the Exchange Act deemed
necessary to protect the American market from substantial harm,
coupled with a relaxation of the American regulation of foreign issuers
already regulated by a foreign nation, would provide the basis for a
•de facto lor de jure minimum, nondiscriminatory standard of regula-
tion imposed by the major developed nations."'
JAMES G. BRUEN, JR.
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